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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to elicit the sensitivity of farmers to pay-
ment for agro-environmental services in a context of strong ecological and
policy constraints. We present results from a choice experiment survey
performed among the whole population of agricultural decision-makers
(104) in the Camargue area. Several econometric models have been esti-
mated, the most signi￿cant being the Latent Classes one. Three classes
have been identi￿ed, two of them representing farmers with strong com-
mittment to a speci￿c technology (either very chemicals intensive or or-
ganic farming ), the main class encompassing farmers complying with the
norms of the PGI « Riz de Camargue » . The estimated parameters of the
utility function, together with the parameter of the monetary attribute
provided the monetary value of each relevant agro-ecological attribute and
the associated outcomes (average and risk yield). Outcomes of the choice
experiments make a strong case for di⁄erentiating incentives for spreading
environmental friendly technologies.
Keywords : Agricultural Technological Choices, Agro-environmental
measures, Policy Instruments design, Choice Experiments, Sample Selec-
tion Model, Latent classes Model, Random Parameter Model, Rice pro-
duction, Organic farming
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1Introduction
Overall in the world the complex relationship between the technology of agricul-
ture and the environment is placed under scrutiny. The motivations behind that
interest are context-dependant, and pertain to market strategies, to strategies of
international negotiation or to consumers demand for pesticides-free products.
Moreover, the protection of the environment itself could be locally important,
specially in area with a great natural heritage value, as in the Camargue area.
In such a context, it is di¢ cult to organize the spatial coexistence of intensive
agriculture and biodiversity rich area (Green et al. 2005). Mainly because the
importance of spillover arising from the intrication of water channel network. If
zoning and specialization of zones in segregated spaces for intensive agriculture
and biodiversity conservation prove to be not possible or very di¢ cult, then it
is worth to look at the distribution of farmers preferences and motivations when
they choose their technology of rice production.
In each case, balancing between the economic e¢ ciency and the preservation of
the environment calls for a careful analysis of the farmers ability to change their
practices. Compensating payments could be in some cases necessary to moti-
vate farmers to adopt environmental friendly technologies, but if this is done,
they are not automatically undi⁄erentiated.
The general assumption of the paper is that farmers face several norms
and constraints, but they have nevertheless a scope for expressing individual
choices. To test that hypothesis, we used a choice experiment approach. Choice
experiments are useful tools to measure either the willingness to accept or the
willingness to pay for a set of attributes characterizing goods, services or tech-
nology. In that paper, we will present the results of the choice experiment survey
performed among the whole population of agricultural decision-makers (104) in
the Camargue area, Rhone River delta, France. Moreover, using suitable econo-
metric models, such as Random Parameter Logit or Latent Class Models, it
will be possible to asses and characterize the underlying heterogeneity in the
farmers technology choices. More precisely, we would like to gain insights on
the heterogeneity of farmers preferences regarding both the attributes of the
technology and the related compensatory payments.
Our use of choice experiment to assess the farmer willingness to accept for
speci￿c attributes of agricultural technology with di⁄erentiated impacts on the
environment is , according to authors￿ knowledge of the literature, original.
The results are useful inputs for the design of policy instruments, as long as the
regulator is concerned for e¢ cient use of public funds. Helping in the design of
di⁄erentiated payments. for speci￿c environmental services could be a bene￿cial
outcome of our research1.
1This research is co-funded by the two Regional Government of Provence-C￿te d￿ Azur and
of Languedoc -Roussillon
21 Litterature review
The issue we are about investigating is related to three di⁄erent ￿elds of the
literature : agricultural household models, technology adoption and choice ex-
periments.
The ￿rst ￿eld is on the issue of separability between household decision
making and farm management and concern the impact of individual utility
function of the farm manager, on the choice of farming style and of production
technology.
The second ￿eld of relevant literature concerns the technology adoption
process, and how we can discriminate between individual factors and social in-
fuences and interactions pertaining either to collective action or to commercial
relationships ?
Finally , it is worth to examine how the question at stake has been investi-
gated in the choice experiments litterature.
In their choice of production technology, farmers have preferences not only re-
garding productivity or pro￿tability, but also for various attributes of crops,
animals or farming practices. Utility-based adoption models already provide
evidence of the importance of the technology￿ s perception by the farmers. Batz
et al . show that the speed and the level of adoption of a speci￿c technol-
ogy depend on the level of the investment required, the risk involved, and the
complexity and the di¢ culties of the task involved in the curse of the imple-
mentation (Batz, 2003).
Adesina et al. draw attention to the lack of concerns about the farmers￿per-
ceptions of the characteristics of the technology. They use a Tobit model of
adoption of new and improved rice cultivars in Sierra-Leone, and show that the
characteristics of a cultivar that are taken into account are not only those re-
lated to yield or input use, but also those related to subjective traits (Adesina
et aL, 1993).
In a context of subsistence farming, Dalton used a hedonic model of rice traits
showing that yield is not a signi￿cant factor in the adoption, compared with
the length of plant lifecycle, plant height, grains properties (colour, elongation,
swelling and tenderness). (Dalton, 2004).
Birol and al. analyzed the valuation of agrobiodiversity by Hungarian small
farmers in their Home gardens using a choice experiment. They rely on four
components of the home-garden system (Richness of crop varieties and fruits
trees, crop landrace, integration of crops and livestock production, organic pro-
duction versus pesticides use). Preferences of small farmers who are oriented
toward the satisfaction of the household￿ s needs are described by the mean of
the prefered choice sets, and translated into monetary terms (Birol 2008).
Roessler and Scarpa use a choice experiment survey to assess the preferences of
farmers breeding pigs in Vietnam. Based on the set of ￿ve attributes (growth,
reproduction, disease resistance, feeding needs and physical appearence), they
identi￿ed two types of breeders as folow : « resources driven » and « demand
driven or market oriented » breeders. (Roessler, 2007).
3Birol et al. presented a latent class approach for the Mexican smallholders fac-
ing a choice between the use of the traditional « milpa » system, based on the
conservation of genetically diverse maize , and the GM maize (Birol 2006).
Dupraz and al. (Dupraz, 2003) stated that farmers￿households are together
producers and consumers of the environment they contribute to forging. They
accomodate the multifonctionnality of the agricultural production in considering
the technological ￿ exibility of their environmental supply. Using a contingent
valuation survey , they con￿rmed that farmers behaviour is in￿ uenced by envi-
ronmental preferences. More precisely, Davies and Hodge found that two atti-
tudinal factors, « stewardship orientation » and « technological beliefs » were
by far the most signiifcant in determining the acceptabilitiy of cross-compliance
in the CAP implementation (Davies, 2006). As a consequence, structural and
socio-demographic factors were considerably less impportant. They identi￿ed
clusters of farmers according to their overall attitudinal orientation.
In the same line , Schmitzberger and al., using the concept of « styles of farm-
ing » elaborated by Van der Ploeg, established the link between those styles,
land use intensity and motivations for biodiversity conservation and participa-
tion in agri-environmental programs (Schmitzberger et al, 2005). Van der Ploeg
de￿ned styles of farming as « a unity of thinking and doing » . Farming styles
encompasse human attitudes, farming objectives, economic success and ecolog-
ical performance. (Van der Ploeg, 1994). Identifying and characterizing the
main farming styles inside a set of farmers or an area proved very useful to
target some subsets of farmers able to foster a wider adoption of improved weed
management strategies by broadacre croppers in Australia (Howden, P. and al.,
1998)
Finally, two main conclusions arise from this literature review. The ￿rst
one is related to the importance of subjective factors and preferences in the
choices of technology ￿ s attributes (even if few papers are dealing explicitly with
the implementation ). The second is about the importance of the diversity of
perceptions and farming styles or subcultures (the heterogeneity issue).
2 Local context
The Camargue is a large area made of intricate ￿elds, marshes and lagoons
in and around the Rhone River Delta (South of France). It belongs to the set
of biodiversity hotspots around the Mediterannee Sea registered in the Ramsar
convention and also in the European Framework « Habitat, Fauna and Flora » .
The area has been recently accepted as part of to the « Man and Biosphere »
reserves network. Several local institutionnal arrangements for managing water
and biodiversity in the landscape have been ￿nally designed in a context of con-
￿ icting interests (Water Local commission, and Parc Naturel de Camargue).
Wheat production and cattle are the main agricultural activities, while various
recreational activities, commercial hunting among them, provide high income
to landlords. The agricultural production is very intensive, but the use of pes-
ticides and herbicides is highly controlled by several administrative regulations
4and collective institutionnal arrangements. Irrigated rice growing is used to
￿ ush salt from the rootzone after some years of dry farming.
However the rice cultivars need to be adapted to the local weather conditions
(low spring and autumn temperatures , wind). As a result, the production costs
are high and the average yields low. In the actual setting of the CAP, farmers are
entitled to uncoupled compensatory payments varying from 400 to 1000 Euros/
ha.
Map 1 : Location of the Camargue area and the surveyed farm
53 Model of technology choice
We assume that farmer￿ s population exhibits a diversity of preferences re-
garding the prefered technology. Preferences diversity encompasses both the
aversion/addiction to pesticides use, the aversion to the use of seasonal wage
workers, the risk aversion, among others. It is well known that agricultural pro-
duction faces a number of constraints arising from the climat, the local agro-
ecological conditions or the farm￿ s structure. The multiplication of constraints
limits the scope for expressing preferences. Moreover, it is often di¢ cult to dis-
tinguish constrained choices from unconstrained one.
For instance, farmers practising organic farming face several agro-ecological con-
straints arising from the di¢ uclty of controling the weeds. As a consequence,
the long rotation of rice is a necessity (one year of rice , three years of others
cereal) in that case. But that constraint could be softened by controling weeds
trough manual weeding, which is costly and implies high transactions costs. As
a consequence, farmers averse to the use of wage workers could prefer to reduce
the rice area.
Assuming a diversity of preferences related to the use of pesticides and to the
use of seasonnal wage workers, we propose to distinguish, as in Schmitzberger,
(Schmitzberger, 2005) two subpopulations, the productivity oriented farmers,
the environmentally friendly oriented farmers and a third subset of support
oriented farmers. While the farmers belonging to the ￿rst style of farming are
willing to use more pesticides and grow more rice, the second one are willing
to avoid them, and accept to use more workers to remove weeds. The third
group of farmers belonging to the support optimizers could choose either one
technology or another, depending of what is giving the more pro￿table outcome.
6Figure 1 shows how the production possibilities frontiers, expressing the di-
versity of technologies, could ￿t with the preferences related to the corresponding
farming styles.
4 Survey design and data collection
Before proceeding to the survey implementation, we gained the support of
the main stakeholders in the Delta, the rice growers side (Centre Fran￿ais du Riz,
Syndicat des Riziculteurs de France et FiliŁre, SRFF) and the Environmental
and Landscape Agency side (Parc Naturel RØgional de Camargue, PNR). That
proved to be very important in securing a good stewardship of the survey and
good conditions for the interviews. Interviews were managed by the authors
and by 3 professional surveyors, each having in charge a speci￿c area.
The attributes choosen to describe cropping technology should be credi-
ble and relevant. Nonetheless, the number of attributes is constrained by the
cognitive burden involved in the choice tasks.We thus identi￿ed six attributes,
assuming they are the main factors explaining the farmers technology choices
7(Table I below). Three of them are related to agro-ecological means; the length
of life cycle of rice cultivar, the weeds control technology and the type of crop-
rotation. Two other concern outcome; the average yield over ￿ve years and the
the yield variability. The ￿nal attribute is a monetary attribute, representing a
compensating payment.
Weeds control appears to be one of the main problems in irrigated rice cropping
in the area. The technology chosen has implications in terms of workforce, use
of herbicides, and impact on the biodiversity and environment. It is therefore
important will to de￿ne farmers￿sensibility about the choices of weed control
technology. The practices proposed in the choice sets are currently practised
in the area, even if not very widespread, for instance, manual and mechanical
weeding.
The choice of the rice cultivar, involving the length of the crop￿life cycle, is
another relevant attribute insofar as it has consequences on production risk.
The type of crop rotation on the same plot is constrained by the weed control
and by the salinity of the root zone. When the weed control is not good enough,
it is necessary to leave rice cropping for wheat or alfa-alfa. But after a few years
of wheat cropping, it is necessary to go back to irrigated rice cropping, to ￿ ush
salt from the root zone2.
We used a fractional factorial design to create the experiment structure. An
optimal and e¢ cient design is characterized by three properties, orthogonality,
balance and minimum overlap (Huber et Zwerina, 1996). We generated it with
SAS R ￿ software program, following guidelines by Kuhfeld (2004). The e¢ cient
choice task design resulted in 24 choice sets. In order to limit the number of tasks
per respondent, we split them in two blocks. Two sets were discarded due to the
lack of realism, so each rice grower faced 11 choice sets, each containing three
options. We could not introduce a status quo alternative, given that each farmer
has a di⁄erent business. There were two alternatives and one opt-out option,
in which the farmer choose to leave his land unexploited. This later option can
provide null or even negative utility (Table II). The main interest of the opt-out
option is twofold : not to force respondents to choose an unsatisfactory option,
and being relevant, because the fallow is an option in the actual CAP.
The questionnaire was organized in three parts. The ￿rst one is about the
respondent ￿ s personal identity, with some opinion questions concerning their
conception of the farmers ￿ profession, and their sensibility with respect to en-
vironmental preoccupations.. The second one is the choice experiment exercise
itself, The last part concerns questions about the description of the entreprise,
for instance the size, the crops, the crop rotation, the suppliers, the customers,
and the presence of marshes...
Starting from a list of 200 farming entities delivering rice to the rice process-
ing industry, the ￿nal whole population of decision makers has been de￿ned as a
list of 104 managers involved in the economical and technological decision mak-
ing process (often, the same manager is in charge of managing several farming
2We are grateful to J.C. Mouret (INRA, UMR Innovation) and to C. Thomas (CFR) for
their helpful advices and comments. Final choice of attributes remains our responsability
8units). One would remarks that the list represents the entire population of the
decisions maker, and not simply a sample.
Table I : Attributes description and levels
Attributes Description Levels
Weeds control Method of weeds control 1 : intensive chemical weeding (three applica-
tions or more),
technology 2 : chemical weeding with one or two applica-
tions,
3 : lines seeding and mechanical weeding,
4 : counterfacted seeding and manual weeds
removing
Cultivar choice Rice cultivar characterized by 1 : short cycle : 140-150 days,
a di⁄erent length of life cycle 2 : medium cycle : 150-160 days,
3 : long cycle : > 160 days
Crop Rotation￿ Rice return time on the same 1 : long rotation (1 year of rice /5 years),
type plot. It is the number of years 2 : ￿cereal￿rotation (2 years of rice / 5 not
necessarily consecutive years ),
of rice growing 3 : ￿intensive cereal ￿ rotation (2 or 3 consec-
utive years of rice )
Average yield over Average of the wheat yield for 1 : < 2 tons,
￿ve years a ￿ve years period 2 : [ 2 ; 5 t[,
3 : [ 5 ; 7 t [,
4 : ￿7 t
Yield variability Frequency of yields below the 1 : 0 year,
average 2 : 1 year,
3 : 3 years
Compensatory Extra income o⁄ered either 1 : 0 Euro,
payment by the market, or by the CAP 2 : 400 Euros / ha,
over the base margin created 3 : 700 Euros / ha,
by the scenario 4 : 1000 Euros / ha
9Table II : example of a choice set
In the event where the following technical itineraries would be the only you
face to produce, Which one would you prefer adopt ?
options Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
Weeds control
technology
Fake seeding and manual
weeding
Lines seeding and me-
chanical weeding
Crop rotation ￿intensive cereal￿ ￿cereal￿
Varietal choice Short cycle Long cycle
Average yield
over ￿ve years




1 bad year with respect to
the average




0 euros / ha 1000 euros / ha Leave the land un-
exploited
A /_ / B /_/ C /_/
5 Models Estimations
The choice data were analyzed and estimated using LIMDEP 9.0 software
program, and more precisely the package NLOGIT 4.0. We have four quanti-
tative attributes (varietal choice, average yield, risk and monetary attribute),
and two qualitative (weeds control technology and crop rotation) we have coded
using e⁄ect coding. For the two scenarios proposed, the rice growers￿indirect
utility derived from the attributes of our choice experiment study takes this
form :
V ij = CV (Zvarietal choice) + RISK(Zrisk) + ROL(Zlong rotation)
+ROC(Zcereal rotation) + AEM(Zmanual weeding)
+ASM(Zmechanical weeding) + ACHI(Zintensive chemical weeding)
+RDT(Zyield) + PRI(Zmargin differential)
and the following form for the third alternative, the opt-out one :
V ij = ASC
We introduce here an Alternative Speci￿c Constant (ASC) to take into account
e⁄ects on utility which are not explained by the attributes, and the utility func-
tion takes a such form in this option because of the absence of attribute and level
to describe it, given it is an opt-out alternative. This is a way to model these sit-
uations in choice experiment work. After having estimated a basic multinomial
logit model, several others models were estimated to consider ￿rst the presence
of the opt-out option (sample selection model), and then to better integrate the
10heterogeneity in the rice growers tastes (Random parameter model and latent
class model).
5.1 The basic multinomial logit model
Table III : Estimates of the multinomial logit model
Variable Value std error of ￿
ASC -0,6942 0,8667
Cultivar choice -0,0078 0,0057
Rotation











Number of observations 1144
Number of parameters 10
Log likelihood -1154,521
Rho-squared 0,14347
*, **, *** means statistically signi￿cant at 90%, 95% and 99% signi￿cance level
For qualitative variables, we chose as reference levels those which are the
most widespread among the current practices of the rice growers in Camargue.
The parameter attributes associated with levels ￿cereal￿ rotation, long rota-
tion, mechanical weeding, and those for risk, yield and prime are all signi￿cant,
at the 1% level of con￿dence (except ￿cereal￿ rotation, signi￿cant at the 5%
level of con￿dence). We can note that long rotation and mechanical weeding
are unfavorable to producers, whereas ￿cereal￿rotation, higher yield and pre-
mium bring a greater utility to respondents. The parameter estimate of risk is
found to be negative, as expected, that is an increasing risk is associated with
a decreasing utility, signifying that farmers are adverse to risk. The ASC of
the opt-out option is not signi￿cant, that can be explained by the fact that
the hypothesis of Independence of Irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is violated, in-
sofar as the choice of this option depends clearly on the two other scenarios
proposed to the respondent. The IIA property was tested using the Hausman
and McFadden (1984) test. The results are reported in table IV below. All the
information must be included in the estimation, and this is not the case with the
11MNL model. Moreover, the non signi￿cance of attribute levels manual weeding
and intensive chemical weeding can be the result of a too big heterogeneity in
the population of rice growers for these factors, and can reveal the presence of
classes in which the preferences would be di⁄erent. For all those reasons the
MNL model is de￿nitively not appropriate.
Table IV : IIA test
Alternative dropped ￿2 Degree of freedom Probability
Scenario A 28,0554 10 0,001769
Scenario B 19,3113 10 0,036482
5.2 The sample selection model
The sample selection model is a two step model, in which we ￿rst estimate
a probit model to explain the choice of the opt-out option, and then we use
this information to ￿nd the value of attributes￿parameters estimates with a
selection. In the probit model, as well as the attributes characterizing the
scenarios, we introduce instrumental variables, like the practice of additional
recreational activities by the respondent, the presence of cattle or sheeps on
the farm and the choice by the producer of the response ￿stop rice growing￿
to a question on his reaction to the possibility of a hypothetical ban on the
use of chemical weedkillers. The table V presents the ￿nal results, those of the
selection model.
12Table V : Estimates of the sample selection model
Variable Value std error of ￿
ASC 0,6679*** 0,0406
Cultivar choice -0,0040*** 0,0003
Rotation







Intensive chemical 0,0175 0,0173
Risk -0,0201** 0,0086
Yield 0,0052*** 0,0004
Prime 0,0003 *** 0,0000
Number of observations 2415
Log likelihood -1411,562




*, **, *** means statistically signi￿cant at 90%, 95% and 99% signi￿cance level
We can note that more variables are signi￿cant, and the global model is
better, in terms of McFadden ￿2, which is becoming here much better3. The
ASC becomes signi￿cant and positive. The attributes ￿cultivar choice￿ and
￿manual weeding￿become signi￿cant too and negative, as expected. Indeed, it
is clearly possible to see the repulsion exerted by the mechanical and manual
weeding, which are viewed by the respondents as costly practices, in time and
money. The fact that the utility decreases as the length of the life cycle increases
is consistent with the risk aversion, because the longer is the life cycle, the more
the risk is high4. The sign and the signi￿cance of attributes parameters related
to the crop rotation, risk, yield and prime are still the same. The attribute level
intensive chemical weeding is the only one no signi￿cant.
Nevertheless, due to the existence of a signi￿cant group of farmers prac-
ticing organic farming, we decided to estimate two models taking into account
this heterogeneity in the population, the random parameter model and then the
latent class model.
3According to Hensher and Johnson (1981) ￿2 values between 0;2 to 0;4 are consider to
be extremely good ￿ts.
4A seed with a long life cycle forces the rice growers to sow earlier, and thus it can be risky
if the weather is cold during the fertilization, that causes a bad rice rising.
135.3 The random parameter model
In the random parameter models, an assumption over the distribution of
each of the random parameter (the density function f(￿=￿) must be de￿ned.
In this paper, random parameters are speci￿ed to be distributed according to the
weibull distribution.
Table VI : Estimates of the random parameter model
Variable Value std error of ￿
Random Parameters
ASC 0,4957 1,6382
Manual weeding control -2,1191*** 0,5925
Non Random Parameters
Cultivar choice -0,0114 0,0071
Rotation










Number of observations 1144
Log likelihood -1154,5208




*, **, *** means statistically signi￿cant at 90%, 95% and 99% signi￿cance level
The model is still better than the basic MNL one. The manual weeding is
now very signi￿cant, that proves that this attribute level is indeed heterogeneous
among the rice growers population. The attribute related to the length of the life
cycle appears now to not be very signi￿cant, because it is statistically signi￿cant
at less than the 90% signi￿cance level. But the attribute level intensive chemical
weeding is now signi￿cant, with a positive in￿ uence on the farmers indirect
utility. Nothing is change for the other attributes parameters. As we know that
heterogeneity exists in our population, we will thus determine how producers
split into classes, and estimate attributes parameters for each of them. That￿ s
why a latent class seems to be the most relevant model.
145.4 The latent class model
Table VII: Estimates of the latent class model
Variable Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
ASC - 2,5141** 3,5569** 5,3621**
Varietal choice - 0,0074 0,0095 0,0183
rotation
"intensive cereal" 0,2274*** 0,1162 - 0,7145***
￿Cereal￿ 0,1235 0,2156** 0,2093
Long - 0,3509*** - 0,3318*** 0,5052*
Weeds control technology
chemical 0,513 0,8787 - 1,7232
Manual - 0,0157 - 0,7728*** 1,5897***
Mechanical - 0,5397*** - 0,8994*** 1,3060***
intensive chemical 0,0424 0,7935*** - 1,1725***
Risk - 0,1963*** - 0,3139*** - 1,0818***
Yield 0,0238*** 0,0221*** 0,0577***
Prime 0,0010*** 0,0018*** 0,0010*
Probability of class 0,6014 0,296 0,100
Number of observations 1144
Log likelihood -1154,521




*, **, *** means statistically signi￿cant at 90%, 95% and 99% signi￿cance level
The ￿rst class involves 60 % of the population of decision-makers. Attributes
a⁄ecting negatively their utility are the long crops rotation, the mechanical
weeding and higher risk , whereas higher compensatory premium and yield in-
crease their indirect utility. This class certainly encompasses farmers committed
to the technological norms of the PGI (Protected Geographical Indication) ￿Riz
de Camargue￿ . That norm does not exclude the use of chemicals. One could
consider that norm as a main or dominant farming subculture. In that class￿
estimates, several attributes are not statistically signi￿cant. This can be either
the consequence of the cognitive complexity involved by the management of a
high number of attributes, the respondents focusing only on the main attributes
they consider relevant for them, or by the direct in￿ uence of the norm on their
responses.
Beside that core class 1, there are two opposites classes, one being charac-
terized by the rejection of any agro-ecological practices (one third of the overall
population), and the other characterized by their adoption (10%) .
In class 2, all the attributes except the length of the cultivar￿ s life cycle are
signi￿cant. Crop￿ s rotation including more wheat and intensive chemical weeds
control are positively valued, while long rotation, manual or mechanical weeds
15control are negatively valued. In class 3, the parameter of the length of the
cultivar￿ s life cycle is positive and signi￿cant, but the attributes characterizing
the preferences for the crop￿ s rotation are not. Indeed, manual or mechanical
weeds control are valued positively, while intensive chemical weeding is nega-
tively valued.
In both classes 2 and 3, the ASC are positive, a result contrasted with the nega-
tive ASC in class 1. One could interpret that by the di⁄erence in the level of the
reserve utility associated to the opt-out choice. In other words, farmers belong-
ing to class 1 exhibit a negative utility of the no production option. Farmers
belonging to class 2 or class 3 have each a strong and clear farming subculture,
and they prefer to not produce instead of implementing one unwanted technol-
ogy .
These results are in some way surprising, because we have not anticipated the
strength of the preferences for an intensive farming system. The remaining
question is about the interpretation to be given to that observation. Is it really
the expression of a strong farming subculture, or the simple expression of the
existence of one strong agro-ecological constraint arising from the presence of
salt in the underlying soils layers and aquifer ?
6 Estimation of the ￿value￿ of technology￿
attributes
The monetary value of each attribute, called implicit prices or part-worth, could





This implicit price represents the marginal welfare variation for a change in
any of the attribute. It corresponds to a compensatory payment that farmer are
willing to accept (WTA) for adopting an attribute (or for a one unit improve-
ment in the attribute level), in the case of negative values, or to give it up, in
the case of positive values.
16Table VIII : Technology￿attributes implicit prices (in Euros)




Long - 337,39 183,34 510,29
weeds control technology
Manual - 426,99 1605,78
Mechanical - 518,99 - 496,92 1317,14
Intensive chemical 40,81 438,42 - 1184,31
Risk - 188,74 - 173,41 - 1092,74
Yield 22,89 12,23 58,27
All the farmers in the three classes attached a positive value to higher yields,
whereas a negative value has been always attached to the risk attribute. Only
the level of the implicit price for those attributes di⁄ers from class 1 and 2 to
class 3. Class 3, which is certainly associated to organic farming preferences,
exhibits a risk aversion considerably higher than the two others groups.
For all the remaining attributes, preferences are very contrasted from classes
3 to class 1 and 2. For the later, negative values are associated with agro-
ecological practices, while positive one are given to the intensive use of chemicals.
For the PGI ￿Riz de Camargue￿producers, mechanical weeds control and long
rotation (two characteristics of organic farming) are highly negatively valued.
The aversion for the manual weeds control is more moderate, with a lower
negative value. However, we can observe in the second class an important
rejection of all organic agro-ecological practices, more especially manual and
mechanical weeds control, and a strong preference for the intensive chemical
weeding. This class represents indeed an intensive farming subculture. Finally,
the last class is the one with the highly contrasted values. All attributes related
to the weeds control and the risk￿ s level are very important for these rice growers.
They have a strong aversion for an intensive use of chemicals, and are willing
to practice a manual and mechanical weeds control.
Conclusion
Using a choice experiment survey, this research has elicited rice growers valua-
tion of attributes describing their technology￿individual preferences.
With help of experts and after several tests, we identi￿ed ￿ve relevant tech-
nology￿ s attributes, three related to agro-ecological means (length of life cycle
of rice cultivar, weeds control technology, type of crop-rotation), two related
to outcome (average yield and yield variability) and ￿nally, a sixth monetary
attribute, representing a compensating payment in addition of the base gross
margin. Choice sets have been proposed to the farmers, including one opt-out
options, leaving the land unexploited.
17The econometric analysis of the data demonstrated a great heterogeneity
in the preferences among the decision-makers in the area. Random parame-
ters logit and Latent Class Models helped to give a more precise view of that
underlying heterogeneity.
Facing the cognitive di¢ culty of the task choice, respondents certainly used
the references of existing collective norms in the Camargue area as benchmarks.
The Latent Class Model identi￿ed a core class of responses corresponding to
the standard of the PGI ￿Riz de Camargue￿ , and a little one, corresponding
to the ￿organic farming standard￿ . Nevertheless, beside these well-known stan-
dard, an important group of respondents, representing one third of the farmers
population, expressed their preferences for a technology using more intensive
cropping practices. The question about the interpretation to be given to that
observation is still open. Is it really the expression of a strong farming sub-
culture, or the simple expression of the existence of an strong agro-ecological
constraint pertaining to the presence of salt in the underlying soils layers and
aquifer?
Whatever the interpretation would be, the results are nevertheless worthy
for the managers of the collective standards or of the corresponding marketing
channels. Moreover, they have a great value for policy makers, because they
identi￿ed and measured the diversity of values attached to the main components
of the rice cropping technology in the area.
Estimates of the implicit prices show that breathing spaces exist to bring
rice growers about to adopt environmental friendly practices through market
or public policies incentives. It￿ s worth noting that the compensatory payment
to give to farmers of class 1, the most important in number, is of the same
magnitude as the actual ￿bulk unconditional payment￿ , the so-called ￿DPU￿.
Our results could help in designing targeted contracts by sub-area, conservation
or environmental objectives.
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20ANNEX
Empirical data on the surveyed farmers population
General description of the sample
In Camargue area, the rice growers population is almost exclusively male
and old, with more than half of farmers being more than ￿fty years old. More-
over, producers are relatively well educated, in general or with a special educa-
tion in agriculture. With regard to the education in agriculture, the population
split almost equally into those who don￿ t have any particular education in farm-
ing, and those who have received one.
Table I : Socio demographic characteristics of the decision makers
Characteristics Frequency
Age :
- 18-35 years 14%
- 36-50 years 33%





- No general education 10%
- Primary education 14%
- Short secondary education 31%
- Long secondary education 23%
- Higher education 22%
Education in Agriculture:
- No agricultural education 41%
- Primary education 2%
- Short secondary education 16%
- Long secondary education 12%
- Higher education 29%
The rice growing farms in Camargue have usually broadacre (more than 100
ha), and in particular the majority of them are bigger than 200 ha. Only a
low percentage (2,5%) of exploitations are very little, that is a net farming area
below 50 ha.
21Table II: Characteristics of farms
Characteristics Frequency
Net farming area :
- < 50 ha 2,5%
- [50-100 ha[ 23,5%
- [100 ha- 200 ha[ 31%
- >= 200 ha 43%
Organic cropping :
- A part of the whole surfaces in organic 22%
- All surfaces in organic 15%
A typology of rice growers with farming subcultures
We elaborated a typology of the decision makers with respect to the farm￿ s
characteristics and to personal conceptions of the profession.
Due to the importance of recreational activities in the Camargue area , we
focused on the presence on the farm of pertinent criterion such as additional
recreational activities (tourism, commercial hunting, bull race...), marshes (and
more precisely swamps for hunting), cattle (belonging to the farm or not), and
then we included also the average crop￿ s yields.
We ￿nally identi￿ed two main groups:
- the ￿rst one encompasses rice growers who focused only on the farming
production. We call them ￿Entrepreneurs in agriculture￿given that they have
a ￿productivist￿farming subculture and get highest yields. Indeed, only few of
them (7%) are concerned by very lower yields ([2t-5t[). They don￿ t manage any
additional recreation activities nor natural spaces (no land for cattle or marsh).
They represent 40% of the whole population.
- the second one encompasses ￿Multifunctionals Farmers￿who integrate nat-
ural area into their management, while their conception of farming takes into
account ecological considerations. They combine agricultural production, recre-
ational activities, and manage cattle and marshes. A great part of them get
agricultural yields in the range [5t-7t[, but with a greater dispersion than the
￿Entrepreneurs in Agriculture￿ . They represent 60% of the population.
To complete this general presentation, we end up with linking the former ty-
pology to the personal conceptions about the farming profession. That resulted
in the de￿nition of two farming subcultures (Table III).
22Table III : The farming subcultures among the rice growers
According to you, the farmer profession consists to : Frequency
Overall population :
- produce quality food products 66%
- produce raw materials for industry at the lower price 1%
- produce quality food products in controling negative impacts on Environment 33%
- produce recreational and environmental services 0%
￿Entrepreneurs in Agriculture￿:
- produce quality food products 70%
- produce raw materials for industry at the lower price 1%
- produce quality food products in controling negative impacts on Environment 29%
- produce recreational and environmental services 0%
￿Multifunctionals Farmers￿:
- produce quality food products 64%
- produce raw materials for industry at the lower price 0%
- produce quality food products in controling negative impacts on Environment 36%
- produce recreational and environmental services 0%
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